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1. Introduction
The Tri-Border Region in South America spreads across the frontiers of Paraguay, Brazil and
Argentina. It encompasses a trans-border urban conglomerate of about 600 thousands inhabi-
tants in the three countries. Through the years, it has been a frontera porosa (porous border)
where traﬃcking boomed after Paraguayan dictator Alfredo Stroessner declared Ciudad del Es-
te a free-trade zone in the 1960s. The city soon became a shopping paradise for counterfeit,
cigarettes and spirits. Yet, since the 2000s there are sings of some reordering in the region. In
the aftermath of the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States government encouraged
national states to control the ﬂows of people and goods at the region. Allegedly, illegal activities
are headed by international networks, which would ﬁnance religious extremism around the globe.
The governments have accordingly launched a number of plans to improve surveillance, such as
the Integrated System of Migration Registration (SICaM in Spanish) in Argentina in 2005 and
the `sacoleiro law' in 2009, an attempt to regulate smuggling in Brazil. Paraguay has also embar-
ked in 2009 in the renewal of the customs oﬃce at the international bridge. These policies reveal
programmes of increasing state intervention to halt traﬃcking in electronics, drugs, weapons and
humans, and any kind of undocumented border crossing.
The declaration in 1991 of the free-trade region of South America Mercosur,1 marked the
opening of national markets and removal of barriers, which would have enhanced free trade
among the countries. Yet, problems around market protection and conﬂicts on the mobilisation
of goods are just as visible. In the changing international political environment, new policies are
implemented by the governments that result in increased surveillance at their national limits.
The development is clear: the Tri-Border Region, in the practice a liminal space for decades,
has turned since the 2000s into a space of interdiction. Interestingly enough, there are a number
of comparable conﬂicts about law enforcement at the national boundaries of the Latin American
region, which have gained much visibility: the frontier joining Colombia and Venezuela, the
other triple border at Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay, the Chile-Peru border, and the most
notorious case, the Mexico-United States borderline. Quite diﬀerently from the clashes around
the delimitation of frontiers that reduced the populations of South America till the end of the
19th century (Hennessy, 1978), or the `procesos de fronterización' that engendered spaces of in-
betweenness (Grimson, 2003), current border conﬂicts in South America result from the changing
state policies that seek to control actors and commodities deﬁned as illegal. These conﬂicts are
focalised on illegal markets, and not on the expansion of a national territory or the submission
of populations. This concern with illegality has been framed as an outcome from the dominance
of the neoliberal ideology, which rearticulates the national state, its legal order and economy
(Comaroﬀ and Comaroﬀ, 2006). These developments urge academics to look again at borders
and borderlands, and the way in which the state becomes here observable.
The perspective on national borders as a space of interdiction shows the contradictions and
selective nature of neoliberalism at a global scale. In 1989, the fall of communism positioned
neoliberalism as the dominant ideology for the political and commercial relations between na-
tions. Once the material walls between communist and capitalist countries were removed, the
1 Inspired by the model of the European Union, the Mercosur treaty seeks to integrate the members towards
a commercial and political community in South America. The treaty includes not only trade-related issues, but
also political and social rights of citizens in member countries (see Bouzas and Soltz 2001).
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neoliberal ideology nurtured the notion of a new world order without borders, enhancing the
free movement of people, ideas and products (Donnan and Wilson, 1994; Harvey, 2003). At this
stage, global neoliberalism promotes the free market ideology and reduction of state mechanisms
of control. Yet, the neoliberal ideology has proven to be selective at work. While countries were
integrating or intensifying their commercial relations in commercial regions, new walls were at
the same time built: the one diving the United States and Mexico, another between the Israeli
and Palestinian states in the West Bank, or the fence separating the Spanish cities of Ceuta and
Melilla from Morocco. Even more, the terrorist events of September 11, 2001 marked a new stage
in the political relevance of borders. New technologies and legal mechanisms have been since
then introduced to surveil and keep out potential terrorists, religious extremists, undocumented
migrants and illegal ﬂows of goods (Fernández-Kelly and Massey, 2007; Alden, 2008; Sandoval,
2008), these forms of control hinder in the end the mobilisation of ﬁnancial ﬂows, products, ideas
and citizens. Hence, the ideology of free economies for free citizens, is increasingly countered by
the enforcement of borders that become tangible in the airports, check points, internet or the
surveillance of bank transactions. This is a second phase of global neoliberalism, where the state
has reclaimed its central position in the ordering of ﬂows in and out the national boundaries.
In the case of Latin America, the borderline between the United States and Mexico is the
case par excellence in the study of borders (Herzog, 1990; Spener and Staudt, 1998; Vila, 2003).
The frontier here is often used as a conceptual artefact in explaining notions and dilemmas of
inequality, migration and bicultural identity. Yet, the scholarship on borders in Latin America
is far from adequate. Outer regional borders have been privileged over inner borders, and the
overwhelming political relevance of the US-Mexico borderline has overshadowed research on other
locations.
This article poses the concept border synergy to capture the mobility of goods and values
across boundaries, which entails a double connotation, that of the border as the national limit
between countries, but also the one deﬁning legal and illegal domains. This arguments is based
on ethnographic material gathered at the Tri-Border Region during a period of three years.2
Participant observations, interviews and visual recording were among the research techniques
applied. The informants include local entrepreneurs and sellers, social workers, religious leaders,
municipal and federal authorities, and smugglers. Polyphony guarantees here a dense ethnograp-
hic description. The results presented give evidence from an anthropological perspective on the
trans-border smuggling across the national frontiers of Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay, and the
extent economic agents manipulate borders in region. The policies implemented to 'regulate'
smuggling and halt illegal practices at the Tri-Border Region raise relevant questions regarding
the study of border cities, transnational trade and illegality.
2. Border Synergy: Inequality and Conﬂict
The scholarship on borders in the social sciences dates back to the 19th century historical
study of the expansion of the United States across the North American territory by the historian
Frederick Jackson Turner. Since then, the notion of border has inspired scientists to study various
2 The ﬁeldwork here presented was carried out between 2007 and 2010, and had the ﬁnancial support of the
Global Consortium on Security Transformation and the Centre for Latin American Research and Documentation
CEDLA.
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objects and settings, dealing with the formation of national states, illegality, cultural identity
and hybridity. In the scholarship, there are at least four perspectives.
Border as frontier. The notion of frontier, as Turner developed it in his thesis, is grounded on
the ambition of a forming national state that occupies new territories (Henessy, 1978; Donnan
and Wilson, 1994). The annexation of new land to the US territory, expressed in the motto `Ame-
rica for the Americans', entails a cultural frontier driving the mythical destiny of a population.
Frontier expansion is the basis of the cultural identity of the North American nation.
In South America there were processes of border expansion too. The national frontiers of
Argentina and Brazil result from cycles of economical growth, each of which stretched out the
national borders for the exploitation of natural and human resources. The Jesuitic missions, the
conversion of indigenous populations, gold mining, cattle, timber and coﬀee plantations are a few
examples of frontier expansion in the region (Hennessy, 1978; Weber and Rausch, 1994; Bauer,
2001).
Border as geopolitical limit of the nation. A second take on borders is focused on the geopo-
litical limits of the nation, where the borderline is perceived as the outermost layer of the nation
state. Nation states produce their political borders, and when they expand there is conﬂict, since
nations clash against each other. The demarcation of boundaries result from conﬂict, war or
genocide that set up the limits of the nation (Baud and van Schendel, 1997), although borders
can also be expressed as a `natural' outcome  when the geography (i.e. a mountain chain or a
river) `demarcates' the borderline of a nation (Sahlins, 1989; Heyman, 1994; Donnan and Wil-
son, 1994). On the other hand, geopolitical boundaries can result not only from the formation
of a political structure, but inversely because of its absence. National borders may contain an
authority vacuum that results politically and economically proﬁtable. These is the case of the
smuggling states that have come into existence in Africa and the Caribbean, whereas the state
encompasses, regulates and proﬁts from both legal and illegal ﬂows of values and merchandises
(Nugent and Asiwaju, 1996; Flynn, 1997; Dilla Alfonso and Cedano, 2005). Since border regions
are the outer layer of the nation state, they are often perceived as marginal, remote lands of
wilderness. However, Baud and van Schendel argue for a `view from the periphery', so as to
capture the increasingly relevant role of borderlands in the identity and economy of a nation in
the 20th century: [S]uch regions were peripheral to the development of the central state, but
nowadays they may be bustling industrial and urban regions (1997, p. 221).
Border spaces: between two nations. The limits of a nation are deﬁned by the political autho-
rity and result from arbitrary processes of border demarcation, splitting ethnic groups or ancestral
trade regions. Trade networks are disrupted and peoples trapped amongst national borders, de-
ﬁned by the spatiality of their `in-betweenness' (Cohen, 1965 and 1986; Cole and Wolf, 1974).
These are deﬁned in the scholarship as border spaces, a more or less clearly demarcated territory
between national cultures (or national political systems), that often mix and engender hybridity.
Yet, to conﬁne a culture within a `clearly demarcated' border space is artiﬁcial and troublesome.
Cultural boundaries are never clearly set, and border spaces can be perceived either as a source
of conﬂict or be neglected (van Schendel, 2005).
Border as identity marker. The bordering condition of a culture can be the ground of an
ethnic, group or individual identity. Creolisation and biculturalism, as it is the case of the Chicano
culture in US, are good examples (Flores and Yudice, 1990; Hannerz, 1991; Vila, 2003). Here,
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the bordering position of a subaltern culture within a dominant nation is perceived as cultural
renewal, but it can unleash conﬂict too. Living borders are observable in Muslim women wearing
a face veil or scarf in many Western European countries: they have become a main issue of the
public debate and are perceived as the very limit between an individual choice and the secular
state (Moors, 2009). In the eyes of the dominant Western culture, veiled women (the veil as a
religious identity marker) represent the limits of emancipation.
From the four approaches presented above it can be concluded that border theory assesses
the diﬀerential ratio between two diﬀerent entities  a nation, a territory to explore, a cultural
identity. For the purposes of this article, the analytical attention lies here on the border as a
geopolitical location.
Borderlands and border cities, loci of exchanges and mobilisation, become attractive when
national markets and economies highly diﬀer from each other. The diﬀerences among two coun-
tries are the motor of the economies at the border; they generate border synergy. Border synergy
is thus the ratio of the diﬀerences or asymmetries between nations that become materialised at
the border, causing market opportunities from which actors proﬁt.
Border synergy is tangible in the mobilisation of people and goods pushing through national
borders. In the transport of values, agents manipulate the diﬀerences between countries (in their
taxing systems or markets) to make a proﬁt. The bigger the economic or political diﬀerences
between countries are, the stronger border synergy is. Borderlands and border cities joining
asymmetrical countries are extremely busy, they have hence a high border synergy. The task of
the nation state as political authority is however to regulate border synergy, to ﬁlter and organise
the mobilisation of commodities and populations. State intervention becomes observable in the
introduction and enforcement of deﬁnitions of legality. This is however a conﬂictive process.
Conﬂicts around border synergy have been documented, for instance, in the ethnographies of
borderlands as problems of legal order. In his study of the Bangladesh borderlands van Schendel
demonstrates that borders are spaces of synthesis where the legal and illegal domains merge: [T]he
state elite itself combined positions of power and accumulation and used these entrepreneurs
[smugglers] as kingpins in coalitions to prop up its control of the state [. . . ] as well as its control
of networks of accumulation (2005, p. 174).
The prevalence of illegality accompanies the ethnography of borderlands. In his study of the
`making' of the Ghana-Togo frontier, Nugent observed the ambiguous relation between smugglers
and local embodiments of state power (2002, p. 255-71). In the case of Asia and based on her
research on smuggling networks at borderlands in China, Thailand and Burma, Sturgeon states:
[F]or state oﬃcials, the dynamics across the border have continued to be both dangerous and
enticing, to be avoided and secretly accessed (2004, p. 482). Studies on the borderline between
the US and Mexico point out at the conﬂicts and loyalties between oﬃcials and human or drugs
traﬃckers (Martínez, 1994; Cunningham and Heyman, 2004; Edberg, 2004; Velasco Ortiz, 2005).
Scott has also paid attention to these accommodations between state and illegal actors at the
borders, and concludes that infrapolitics prevail (1990): The interests of the local actors overcome
the rule of law. Clearly, there is something about the elusiveness of borders where the legal and
illegal domains converge and the presence of state actors becomes ambiguous.
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3. The Tri-Border Region in South America
At the arrival hall of the international airport of Foz do Iguaçu in Brazil, a blond young
woman dancing in a bikini with the national colours of the Brazilian ﬂag welcomes visitors. Next
to her, there are two black men playing samba, all smiles. Once the travellers have disembarked,
the dancer and musicians take a break and wait until the next ﬂight arrives to repeat their
performance. In the airport, on the streets and local press, advertisements targeting Brazilian
readers promote Ciudad del Este: The national colours of Paraguay form a circle, with a white
ribbon in front that symbolises the bridge between the Brazilian city of Foz do Iguaçu and the
Paraguayan Ciudad del Este: `You are free to think. You are free to act. You are free to choose.
Come to your shopping freedom in Paraguay' (Picture 1). This advertisement deﬁnes freedom
as conspicuous consumption and implicitly points at a lack of freedom in the over-regulated
Brazilian economy. Freedom from the protective Brazilian policies, freedom to shop in the free-
trade zone in Ciudad del Este.
The opening in 2009 of a shopping centre in Ciudad del Este, just a few meters away from
the Brazilian border has opened a `war' of duty-frees. At each side of the three countries there
are competing shopping facilities. In the Argentinean border, the ﬂashy and minimalist Duty
Free Shop Puerto Iguazú, is much advertised: `Vení a conocer el mejor duty free shop del mundo'
(come to visit the world's best duty free shop) where designer perfumes and personal care articles,
clothing and electronics are sold. At the Brazilian side, there is also o shopping Cataratas for
high-end shopping in Foz do Iguaçu. Taxi drivers rightly say: `here there are two things, waterfalls
and shopping'.
The urban image of the three cities is deﬁned by consumerism and the free-market ideology.
Consumption is presented as the ultimate cultural experience and the only way to access leisure.
Since the foundation of the South American free-trade block Mercosur in 1991, the cities have
GCST, New Voices Series, no. 6, October 2010 6
Stretching the Border: Smuggling Practices
and the Control of Illegality in South America José Carlos G. Aguiar
been trying to position themselves as tourist destinations and shopping paradises, to diversify
the options for the visitors who come to enjoy the Iguaçu Waterfalls. This a clear example of a
new Latin American modernity shaped by the expectations of consumerism and global cultural
citizenship: urban landscapes are designed by the service industries, neighbourhoods organised
around shopping centres, cinemas and supermarkets (Jones and Varley, 1999; Guano, 2002).
Nevertheless, this image of bonanza has a counter side.
The expectation of conspicuous consumerism in Foz do Iguaçu coexists with violence and
marginality. The city, with a population of about 320 thousand inhabitants, is the second tourist
destination in Brazil, just behind Rio de Janeiro;3 yet, tourism has not brought prosperity to
larger social sectors: favelas spread across the city, characterised by violence and crime. Foz do
Iguaçu has the highest homicide rate in Brazil among young people (15-25 years), and the second
among the total population, with 223,3 violent deaths per 100 thousand inhabitants; it ranks
number ﬁve at national level in robbery with weapons (Zamberlam and Corso, 2007; Waiselﬁsz,
2007). The violence caused by struggles and executions between smugglers and dealers, points
at the pivotal position, in particular, of Foz do Iguaçu in the smuggling map, and in general, the
upcoming role of Brazil in the international traﬃcking for illegal drugs.
On the Argentinean side, there is a general lack of perspective and wide-spread poverty in
Puerto Iguazú. Young and ambitious inhabitants soon realise they must migrate in order to be
able to fulﬁl their material and professional aspirations.
In Ciudad del Este, the absence of urban infrastructure and corruption hinders growth and
the rule of law. Although the city reports 50% of the tax revenue in Paraguay, tax base is limited
and industrialisation weak (Nickson and Lambert, 2002; Rodríguez, 2006). Poverty, inequality
and crime deﬁne the social landscape of Ciudad del Este.
3.1. Historical Background and Sociodemographic Developments
The Tri-Border Region is well known for its natural assets. Here, the Iguazú and Paraná river
converge (Figure 1), creating a zone characterised by its biodiversity and the Iguaçu waterfalls.
Since the 19th century, the national governments have fought a number of wars to defend or
expand the borderline, from which the War of The Triple Alliance (1864-1870) is the most
devastating one, when Paraguay lost 60% of the population. As a result, the three national states
set military bases at the Tri-Border Region to secure the limits of the nations and protect their
natural resources (Ferradás, 2004; Lewis, 2006). For many years, for sure until the 1960s, these
settlements had clearly a more political than economic relevance. These military posts passed
mostly unnoticed, even when they became municipalities. Four economic activities have marked
the growth of the Tri-Border Region: Hydroelectric power, trade, tourism and soy production.
3 Information from the website of the municipality of Foz do Iguaçu, http://www.fozdoiguacu.pr.gov.br/
portal2/home_turismo/cidade.asp/, visited on July 10, 2010.
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During Stroessner's dictatorship (1956-1989) the international Puente de la Amistad was built
in 1965 to link the Paraguayan city of Puerto Stroessner (nowadays Ciudad del Este) and Foz
do Iguaçu in Brazil. With this public work, the dictator sought to stimulate the economy in the
region and declared the city a free-trade zone. Paraguay's very economic policy was to encourage
trade with shops in Ciudad del Este and allow import to come in; the merchandises would
reach the neighbouring countries. This policy catapulted diﬀerent forms of trade. Smuggling of
cigarettes and alcohol from Ciudad del Este became much wanted in Argentina and Brazil.
The construction works of the Itaipu Dam (1974-1984) marked the beginning of a demographic
boom in the region (Figure 2). Since the late 1970s the population of the Paraná region has been
exponentially growing. The binational Itaípu Dam, built and run in cooperation between the
Brazilian and Paraguayan governments, is regarded as the most productive hydroelectric plant of
the world, delivering 80% of Paraguay's and 60% of Brazil's energy. Notwithstanding the Itaípu
Dam is a sustainable source of energy, its construction caused the displacement of thousands of
Brazilian farmers and inhabitants who were forced to leave highly proﬁtable land. Many of them
migrated without documents to Paraguay. As a result, a new caste of stateless people came into
existence once these people, that never came back to live in Brazil because they had nowhere
to go, stayed undocumented in Paraguay and formed their own families. The oﬀspring, called
brasiguayos, has no nationality or access to public services, and neither country has the political
will to solve the situation. This displacement still plays an important role in the relation between
the two countries.
GCST, New Voices Series, no. 6, October 2010 8
Stretching the Border: Smuggling Practices
and the Control of Illegality in South America José Carlos G. Aguiar
Indigenous groups have historically been marginalised in the region. The indigenous popu-
lations, among others the guarani ethnic groups Mbya and Nhandéva, suﬀer of spatial disloca-
tion and move across borders (Mendes da Sliva, 2007). The recent displacement caused by the
construction works of the dam, was later continued with the expansion of soy plantations. The
participation of indigenous people in the economy and social life of the cities is rather marginal,
constrained to street selling.
The emergence of the soy industry in the region has risen diﬀerent environmental issues
and political sensitivities between Paraguay and Brazil, since soy farms along the Paraguayan
border are in hands of Brazilian owners (Staduto et al, 2007). Some Paraguayans, particularly the
indigenous population, are enraged with the growing presence of Brazilian farmers in Paraguay;
their perception is that large extensions of land is now owned by foreigners, who proﬁt, pollute
and exploit local population (Sprandel, 2006). Soy and cattle farms are every now and then set
on ﬁre, and farmers harassed or executed.
The region has much proﬁted from its position as a trading post. International migrants from
all regions of the world play a central role in the growth of the zone. Migrants represent up to 40%
of the population in the region (Zamberlam, Corso, Machado Silva et al, 2006, p. 23). Immigration
to Ciudad del Este was encouraged and numerous Lebanese, Palestinian, Chinese, Taiwanese and
Korean communities settled, developing transnational trade networks (Rabossi, 2004; Pinheiro-
Machado, 2008). Traders and investors created organisations to defend their interests, unions
that are much comparable to those under corporatist and clientelistic political systems, as it is
the case of Mexico, that fuse formal and informal politics (Cross, 1998).
In the 1980s, Ciudad del Este consolidated itself as a trade centre with accessible imports
and retail facilities that became consumption paradises for Argentinians and Brazilians who
were eager to step out from their restrictive ISI national economies and enjoy from Paraguay's
taxing advantages and imports' assortment. By the mid 1990s the region was identiﬁed as the
third largest trade post in the world: `Ciudad del Este was generating US$12 to US$13 billion in
cash transactions annually, making it the third city worldwide behind Hong Kong and Miami'
(Rotella, 1998, p. 1). This estimation coincides with the information available in other sources
(Grinbaum, 1996, p. 25-6; Ferradás, 2004; Lewis, 2006).
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In 30 years, the region has moved from a local market for counterfeit in the 1960s to an
energy production site in the 1970s, it turned into a main touristic destination in the 1980s,
and became a centre for transnational trade in the 1990s. Nevertheless, this rapid development
also has a controversial side. In the Tri-Border Region, the streets are woven with networks for
informal labour and trading, security and ﬁnancial services that ambiguously relate legal and
illegal domains  if they ever were diﬀerentiated.
3.2. Border Synergy and Illegality in the Tri-Border Region
Suspicions on terrorism, money laundering, drug traﬃcking and smuggling have been since the
1990s circulating on the Tri-Border Region. The attention emerged when Argentinian authorities
stated that the terrorist attacks on the Jewish community of Buenos Aires in 1992 and 1994 were
planned under the Islamic population of the area (Ferradás, 2004; Lewis, 2006). `[V]arious Islamic
terrorist groups, including the Egyptian Al-Jihad (Islamic Jihad) and Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya
(Islamic Group), Hamas, Hizballah, and Al Qaeda, probably have a presence in the [Tri-Border
Region]' (Hudson, 2003, p. 68), including sleeping cells and training camps. Trade in these cities
would be raising funds for terrorist attacks. Argentinean, Brazilian and US authorities claimed
to have evidence of electronic transfers to support extremists groups in the Middle East and
other Islamic countries (Hudson, 2003, p. 14-31; Levitt, 2005).
[A]s the case of Hezbollah criminal activity in the tri-border region of South America
makes clear, the group does engage in criminal activities that gave rise to the unwanted
attention of local and international authorities, including maﬁa-style shakedowns of local
store-owners, illegal pirating of multimedia, and the international drug trade (Levitt, 2005,
p. 11).
Right after the events of September 11, 2001, the concern regarding the Islamic communities in
the Tri-Border Region and the ﬁnancing of international terrorism regained relevance. Based on
military intelligence reports and the Department of the State, the US government denounced that
the region represents a threat to the stability of the South America and the world (Bartolomé,
2002; Hudson, 2003; Lewis, 2006; Naím, 2007, p. 142-4).
There have been open-source indications that the Islamic terrorist network in the TBA
[Tri-Border Area] has maintained telephone communications with operatives worldwide,
including in the United States. The FBI reportedly traced several telephone calls between
the United States and at least one of the TBA cities immediately following the September
11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Whether Islamic terrorists in the TBA played any role in the
September 11 attacks in the United States is not known. Some al Qaeda operatives in the
TBA may have known in advance about the September 11 attacks and discussed the plot
in a mosque in Foz do Iguaçu (Hudson, 2003, p. 33).
According to information from the Brazilian Intelligence Agency (Agência Brasileira de Inteli-
gência) released in 2003, Osama Bin Laden visited the mosque of Foz do Iguaçu in 1995 and
again in 1998 to discuss, among others, on the training of sleeping cells in the region (Junior,
2003; Hall, 2003).
These accusations have resulted in two high-proﬁle detentions. Ahmad Barakat, a Lebanese
citizen, 34 years old, was detained in Foz do Iguaçu in June 2002 and handed over to US autho-
rities; he is supposed to be the chief fund-raising oﬃcer for Hizballah (`Libanês preso no Brasil
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nega elo com terrorismo', Folha de São Paulo, November 19, 2002). In June 2010, Moussa Ali
Hamdan, Lebanese, 38 years old, was detained in Ciudad del Este for charges presented in the
US on raising funds for Hizballah; Hamdan was extradited to the US (`Capturan en el Este a
miembro del Hizbullah', ABC, June 15, 2010). Both detainees denied the accusations. On the
other hand, local authorities, scholars and activists, are skeptical about the suspected connection
between local entrepreneurs and international Islamic terrorism in the region: `it seems there was
ﬁnancing but there are no cells'. Some claim the link between traders and terrorism has helped
to build a smoke curtain, and justify US presence and intelligence exchange between the South
American countries and the US. It is believed that what here really is at stake is the natural
resources, chieﬂy uranium and water, available in the region. Terrorists would be trying to get
uranium. The American government would be interested in the water. Underneath the three
cities, and fed by the Iguazú and Paraná rivers, there is the third largest fresh water reservoir of
the world, the Guaraní Aquifer Complex, with enough water to supply the world's demand for
30 years (Ferradás, 2004).
The mosque Omar Ibn Al-Khattab in Foz do Iguaçu, which is believed to be the largest in
the American continent, is the centre of Islamic community in the region, that counts about 10
thousand believers. The Imam and believers complain that after 20 years of presence and despite
the contribution of the Islamic entrepreneurs and traders to the development of the area, at once
terrorism is magniﬁed to the community as a whole. The accusations perpetuate social stigmas
on Muslims.
US intelligence activities in Ciudad del Este, Foz do Iguaçu and Puerto Iguazú have however
increased. There is strong sensitivity among the population from all backgrounds, to the presence
of US oﬃcers in the cities. During the ﬁeldwork, informants (among others, the young drivers
of the mototaxis) continuously asked: `Are you from the CIA?', or simply denied to provide any
kind of information to a curious foreigner interested on trade and border crossing.
These perspectives come to reinforce negative social representations of this area, above all
in Brazil and Argentina, as a dangerous place, a focus of criminals, terrorist networks and in-
ternational maﬁa. Paraguay is perceived by Argentinean and Brazilian buyers as a place for
contraband, cheap fakes and low-quality items. Residents of Foz do Iguaçu and Ciudad del Este
face the allegations and prejudices everyday, particularly since police and military presence has
increased, with check-ups hindering their daily activities and undertakings.
Illegality constitutes however an important part of the commercial and social life of the area.
Illegal activities in the Tri-Border Region include human traﬃcking, weapons and drug smuggling,
child prostitution, tax evasion and copyrights piracy. International networks for smuggling have
emerged for the transport and distribution of illegal merchandises (Hudson, 2003; Rabossi, 2004;
Lins Ribeiro, 2006). Cocaine and marihuana from the Andes stops in Paraguay in route to
Brazil, Argentina, and further to the European markets. According to US reports, in the Tri-
Border Region there are crime syndicates from China, Colombia, Corsica, Ghana, Italy, Ivory
Coast, Japan, Korea, Lebanon, Mexico, Nigeria, Russia, and Taiwan that launder falsiﬁed and
drug money (Hudson, 2003). Hudson also argues that the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de
Colombia FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) are present.
There have been diﬀerent cycles of maﬁa violence in the region, particularly in Ciudad del
Este, with a peak in the late 1980s and early 1990s when Chinese were ﬁghting against Lebanese
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groups. Since the 2000s urban violence has lost this `ethnical' character, targeting civil population
instead, as it is the case in the Brazilian side.
The emergence of ﬁnancial ﬂows for international terrorism and illegal activities can only
be understood as a consequence of a low rule of law. In Paraguay tax evasion is a rule. In
Ciudad de Este, up to 60% of the economy is not recorded or taxed by the government, and
whenever taxed, there is much underregistration of imports with manipulated invoices. There
are no available sources on the demography of the city either. Widespread is the custom of the
coima, to buy oﬀ authorities: `you can buy, do anything or kill anybody in Paraguay if you have
enough money'.
4. Living at the Border: Smuggling as a Way of Life
The three cities compete against each other as touristic destinations, to win tourists and
shoppers. Smuggling, on the other hand, works just the opposite. Every national `corner' accom-
plishes a particular role and this has engendered some kind of specialisation. There is however
no clear-cut division, since activities often overlap, but more of an order in the way these natio-
nal corners complement each other and conform a regional economic heart pumping resources
into the national economies and capital cities. Trade takes place in Ciudad del Este, where the
commercial streets and busiest shopping centres are. Retail stores in Puerto Iguazú and Foz do
Iguaçu target the local market or tourists, whereas wholesale and transnational trade is localised
in Ciudad del Este. Puerto Iguazú has a marginal position; it is focused on international tourism.
Foz do Iguaçu plays a key role in articulating the three cities observable in the busy ﬂows of
goods across borders.
Workers live in Ciudad del Este, where housing is cheaper. Ciudad del Este has however a bad
urban infrastructure and service provision. Traders and shop owners live in Foz de Iguaçu. The
lack of (quality) public services may explain why entrepreneurs do not return money investing
in the city, they take instead their capital over the border. While money is made in Ciudad
del Este, capitals are placed in Foz do Iguaçu, which has by far a better infrastructure and a
safer long-term perspective than Paraguay. It has a solid market in real state. The skyline of
Foz do Iguaçu is deﬁned by towers of apartments with 20 stories or more, giving some kind of
cosmopolitan allure.
The bordering position of these three cities reveals thus an ambivalent situation: it porousness
has boosted growth, but it has also created a vacuum that synthesises the legal and illegal
domains. In the Tri-Border Region national boundaries are spaces of synergy, where agents
manipulate the diﬀerences between countries to make a proﬁt. There is a variety of economic
activities where people make use of the permeability of the national borders. From the various
economic actors who move across borders three agencies are remarkable: Traders, couriers and
money exchangers.
4.1. Traders: Importers and Shop Owners
Transcontinental migrants own in Ciudad del Este the majority of lojas, that is, established
shops. Many of them arrived in the 1980s and 1990s when trade in the Tri-Border Region was
booming. The introduction of the Mercosur gave a new impulse to the economic life of the urban
GCST, New Voices Series, no. 6, October 2010 12
Stretching the Border: Smuggling Practices
and the Control of Illegality in South America José Carlos G. Aguiar
conglomerate, and it worked as a pulling factor that attracted Lebanese, Palestinian, Chinese,
Taiwanese and Korean migrants who came to the city and started up their own undertakings
(Picture 2).
The Paraguayan government welcomed international migration and issued residence docu-
ments. Migrants are also eligible for the Paraguayan nationality. They were not expected `to
integrate' to Paraguayan society but to make business. Special Arabic or Chinese schools opened
in Ciudad del Este and in Foz do Iguaçu where children learn and appropriate the culture and
language of their parents. Transnational migrants make use of their networks in the country of
origin to supply products and set up new businesses. Quite to the contrary, Latin American
migrants from Bolivia, Peru and Ecuador, seem to be less assimilated in the entrepreneurial life
of the city, and mostly work hired by shop owners. Interestingly, Paraguayans do no take part in
the established trade and retail in Ciudad del Este, they work in the street economy, employed
in the shops owned by foreigners, or in the few factories established in the city.
Lebanese, Syrian, Chinese and Taiwanese traders are well represented in Ciudad del Este's
downtown. These traders are organised in associations according to their ethnicity, which are
useful to lobby and deal with local and national authorities. The Taiwanese community is one of
the oldest international migrant groups in the city, present for already thirty years; they trade
in clothing, toys and computing, but not exclusively. Chinese and Taiwanese traders formed
the Asociación China de Ciudad del Este (Chinese Association of Ciudad del Este), which has
sponsored social projects like street paving and maintenance of public spaces. Lebanese and
Syrian entrepreneurs funded the Cámara de Electrónica (Chamber for Electronics) and are visible
in local politics, for instance, supporting candidates during elections. They are specialised in
electronics, particularly in mobile phones, photography and video.
Zhuan is a trader and secretary of the Chinese association. He is in his late sixties and came
to Ciudad del Este in the 1980s, when there was `nothing, just plantations'. When he is asked
whether Ciudad del Este is so unpleasant and violent as local media state, he replies: `It is envy,
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they just want to take the success of Ciudad del Este away'. In the 1980s, there were a handful
Chinese families in the city. They ran novelty shops with merchandise from Taiwan. Until the
opening of China to international trade in the 1990s, products were imported to Paraguay from
Taiwan. Now, the majority of the merchandise is imported from China, where people `work for
very low salaries and that lowers the cost' for traders. Guangdong is the main industrial city
providing ﬁnished to Brazil and Paraguay (Pinheiro-Machado, 2008).
During the 1990s up to 70 per cent of the shops in Ciudad del Este were in hand of Chinese
owners. According to the association, more than 10 thousand Chinese traders or shop employees
were working in the city in this bonanza period. Most of this migration was however undocumen-
ted. The expanding presence of Chinese traders is the result of an entrepreneurial culture based
on blood ties and a close social control. Chinese migration is family based: one migrant becomes
a pioneer and helps family members to come over. A strong sense of community, with the family
as basis, helps new migrants to integrate to the commercial life of the city. The association as-
sists new Chinese residents to start their own undertaking. Upon arrival, migrants are not able
to communicate in the languages spoken in the region (Spanish, Guaraní, Portuguese). They
are not acquainted with the paperwork or the culture in order to dealing with local authorities.
However, is not only assistance what the association provides, but also parallel banking services.
Chinese traders work in a pyramidal structure, with a ﬂow of credit running downwards, where
capital is lent and merchandise supplied to new migrants. Older traders import containers with
merchandise, which they in turn wholesale and retail to shop owners and sellers.
Nevertheless, with the global economic crisis of the 2000s, and the increasing police survei-
llance at the Brazilian border, retail in the city has slowed down a 30, 40 per cent. Although there
are no oﬃcial sources or accurate demographic statistics available, the depressed retail market
in Ciudad del Este has had an impact on its population. Zhuan thinks there are at the moment
no more than 5 thousand Chinese in Ciudad del Este, that is a half of the population ten years
back.
Traders are migrants who circulate between cities, depending on the local economic climate.
They stay a couple of years in Ciudad del Este to move later again to Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo
or Buenos Aires. Lara, a social worker at Casa Migrante, an organisation that provides legal aid
to undocumented migrants in Foz do Iguaçu, states on transcontinental migration: `They are
no migrants who come to live a whole life here. They come here to work. They are in Brazil
and later in Paraguay. They are driven by the economy, not by the emotions'. In fact, since the
2000s the Korean and Indian communities are the most dynamic in Ciudad del Este, opening
new stores. Charlie is a successful trader who has chosen to stay in Paraguay and managed to
survive the crisis. He is in his early forties and came from Taiwan to Ciudad del Este in 1993,
and was later granted the Paraguayan nationality. Charlie owns two shops downtown, where he
sells toys and novelties from Taiwan. In the larger shop, he has an oﬃce that functions both as
operations centre and as a safe. The space is suﬀocatingly small, with room for only one desk,
a tiny table and two chairs. There are no windows or ventilation available besides an old fan
keeping the hot air moving. On the walls, there are some printed emails, shipping orders, topless
Asian women and pictures of his children pinned.
In the working mess the oﬃce is, there are open cardboard boxes on the ﬂoor and under the
desk full with thousands of dollars and yens. Apparently, the oﬃce is safe enough to keep that
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amount of cash. The boxes full with banknotes seem somehow disturbing in such an austere and
chaotic oﬃce. Charlie has an old computer on the desk, where he permanently checks exchange
currencies on the internet, and receives information on production costs from Taiwanese factories.
Even if he personally knows the factory owners, some of which are his friends, he ﬁrst makes
himself sure that he is getting the best fares. By email and sometimes by fax, he places orders
at the factories. Once shipped from China or Taiwan, the containers arrive in about three weeks
in the harbour of Santos, Brazil. Then, the merchandise is either sent in transit across Brazil to
Asunción or Ciudad del Este, or via Uruguay and Argentina. The transport can take up to four
weeks altogether, depending on how quickly the authorities clear the goods.
As a free-trade zone, Ciudad del Este has a general tariﬀ for all imports of 10 per cent the
value of the merchandise. Nevertheless, Charlie knows his way around and declares just a part
of the products, or at a lower price, or pays a coima (bribe) to customs oﬃcers to pass the
undocumented goods.
4.2. Couriers: Sacoleiros, Laranjas, Paseros
Couriers that mobilise merchandise from one country to the other represent a second link
in the trade network of the Tri-Border Region. Smuggling is organised by nationals of Argenti-
na, Brazil and Paraguay. At every national corner they have a diﬀerent nomenclature: in Brazil
couriers are called sacoleiros (baggers) and laranjas (oranges), although many are in fact women
known as camelós (camels). In Argentina and Paraguay, couriers are paseros (passers). All the-
se names refer to people who smuggle in small quantities of merchandise and, although these
traﬃckers are a link of a larger network, they enjoy some extent of autonomy.
Brazilian sacoleiros travel to Ciudad del Este from neighbouring cities, mostly from São Paolo,
by bus to make use of the monthly allowance they can import. In 2009 it was a total of US$150,
but in the years before Brazilian citizens were allowed to import up to US$300 every month.
They come to Ciudad del Este to buy toys, clothing, blankets, electronics, cameras, cigarettes
and bootleg, and transport them in plastic bags. They arrive to Paraguay early in the morning;
by the end of the day cross the border and return home. Sacoleiros travel with little money, and
make no signiﬁcative expenses for hotels or lunches. It is not a leisure travel. They cross to shop.
At the Brazilian side, the international bridge Puente de la Amistad is particularly busy
during the weekends. The bridge has two lines and sidewalks. The bridge is maintained in coope-
ration between the two countries, that is why half of if is painted with the colours of the Brazilian
ﬂag, and the other half with the Paraguayan. Early in the morning, there is already a long li-
ne of cars crossing to Paraguay. Cars are not checked when leaving Brazil, and the traﬃc jam
expands from Foz do Iguaçu reaching Ciudad del Este's downtown: a four kilometre long line
of cars standing still. People make also use of busses, collective taxis (a car shared by various
passengers), taxis, mototaxis or go by foot. Between the cars, mototaxis drive dangerously fast
over the bridge. The pedestrian lane is also full but ﬂuid. The majority of the people crossing by
foot are locals, sacoleiros and some Argentinian tourists. People walk into Paraguay without any
border control. However, there is some random control at the Paraguayan border, particularly
ﬂashy cars and vans, or automobiles with polarised windows. Once people cross the border, they
vanish away in the shops and commercial streets of Ciudad del Este.
Quite dﬀerently from the Brazilian side, in Ciudad del Este there is a sizeable street economy,
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from which indigenous people, elderly, youngsters and children make a living. The contrast bet-
ween Brazil and Paraguay is evident: in Ciudad del Este there seems to be no distinction between
stores and public space: the streets, avenues, parks and roundabouts become one big commercial
zone. Sellers approach travellers and ask right away: `¾qué busca?' (what are you looking for?).
Illegal goods are widely available on the street, including counterfeit, cocaine, marijuana and
weapons. On the streets, people are playing truco (a traditional cards game from the region), se-
lling quinielas (lottery), cigarettes, soft drinks, snacks and pirate CDs. Conservative estimations
count up to 2000 people working in downtown's streets (Rabossi, 2004); yet, the municipality of
Ciudad del Este has no record on the amount of street peddlers.
Since the 2000s, sacoleiros have become specialised in the smuggling of electronics, which
presents various advantages. This merchandise is much wanted in the Brazilian market, where
tariﬀs on imported electronic devices are high. In addition, mobile phones, (video)cameras and
computer memories are easy to transport and their value is higher than that of a blanket or a
toy. Hence, electronics render a larger proﬁt and are easier to smuggle.
On the streets there is a massive amount of merchandise being mobilised in pick-ups and
cars, but also on the shoulders of youngsters and in carts pulled by children. In the cardboard
boxes there are electronics and novelties with destination to Brazil.
The afternoon is peak hour in Ciudad del Este and the international bridge is crowded both
directions. As travellers still arrive to Paraguay, sacoleiros start their trip back home (Picture 3).
They cross by foot or take a bus from Ciudad del Este into Brazil. When taking public transport,
they try to pass unnoticed, yet, their bulky packages may rise some attention from the customs
oﬃcers.
In order to reduce risk, sacoleiros cross the border many times in one day, with small amounts
of merchandise every time. By safely crossing with few items, sacoleiros can smuggle hundreds
of dollars the same day.
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Every bus coming from Paraguay into Brazil is checked by the ﬁscal police. When the bus
stops two ﬁscal police oﬃcers jump in and look at the suitcases and bags people carry. The
police know the vast majority of the travellers are smugglers. There is silence; everybody holds
the breath. Among the passengers, there are many laranjas transporting blankets, clothing and
toys. Dark plastic bags catch much attention. Even before they are asked to, women open their
bags to allow oﬃcers to take a peek.The police look through the goods to check if there is
something else hidden. Nobody says a word. An oﬃcer tears oﬀ one of the black plastic bags a
woman carries to take a closer look. Rolled in a baby blanket, the laranja is transporting three
mobile phones. She is asked to get down and go to the oﬃce for further revision. That will take
a while. On the ground, there are dozens of people queuing at the customs oﬃce to clear their
merchandises. As the woman waits for her turn, she takes out from her wallet fake receipts with
a lower value of the products. If she is lucky, she will be allowed to pay import taxes based on
the amount declared, otherwise her merchandise will be conﬁscated.
In the bus, the police check continues. Some people are asked questions about the shops they
visited or how long they stayed in Paraguay. After a couple of minutes, the revision has ﬁnished;
the police hit the back of the bus as a go sign, and travellers breath again and laugh. For a
moment, there is a feeling of collectivity everybody shares: we cleared the border. Right away,
some sacoleiros open their bags to take a look at the merchandise: there are cameras, computer
memories, mobile phones hidden in the handbags and bus seats. An older lady smiles while she
caresses the painting set box she apparently had for her grandson, who sits next to her.
People crossing the border are in fact mobilising goods, they are involved in some form of
petty smuggling. Mototaxis, for instance, double-shift as paseros, and traﬃc in mobiles and
computer components hidden in their helmets or inside the seats and tires of the motorcycles. In
one day they can cross the border twenty times or more, avoiding any control. They are hired by
shop owners to transport components to Brazil. Contraband takes place however all directions.
Restaurant owners in Foz do Iguaçu buy supplies in the supermarkets of Puerto Iguazú, since
the exchange rate of the Argentinean peso is very convenient for Brazilians. Packages of juice,
pasta and groceries available at the supermarket are smuggled from Argentina into Brazil. The
pasero makes use of public transport and is later picked up once he crossed the border. Further,
agricultural products (eggs, sugar, meat) are smuggled from Brazil into Paraguay, where there
is practically no agricultural industry.
However, the impression of an open border for all kinds of traﬃcking in all directions may be
deceiving. Due to the increase of control at the Brazilian and Argentinian borders since 2002, new
routes have been found to avoid the international bridges. Smugglers make use of the Paraná and
Iguazú rivers to transport goods by boat from Ciudad del Este to Foz do Iguaçu, or from Puerto
Iguazú to Ciudad del Este and Foz do Iguaçu. These smugglers, called balseros, transport diﬀerent
kinds of goods, such as drugs and weapons into Brazil, and agricultural products from Brazil to
Paraguay and Argentina. Clearly, state surveillance does not terminate smuggling networks, but
removes them from one location to another. As an unintended eﬀect, smugglers come up with
new transportation means and routes.
Sacoleiros and paseros complain about state surveillance at the international bridges; they
believe it is the small smugglers who are targeted, whereas the `big ﬁshes' are doing business as
usual: `[L]o que pasa por el puente es lo de menos. Los grandes contrabandistas no cruzan por el
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puente. Ellos usan aviones o balsas y cruzan por el lago de Itaipú' (what crosses over the bridge
is the least. Big smugglers don't cross over the bridge. They use planes or cross with boats at
the Itaipú Lake).
After years of debate in Brazil on whether sacoleiros should be persecuted as criminals
or allowed to make they own living, the Congress passed the `sacoleiro law' in 2009 (number
11.898/2009). In an attempt to regularise the undertakings of these economic agents, sacoleiros
are deﬁned under this law as importers, small entrepreneurs that have to register and meet ta-
xing duties (42,25% on the price paid for the merchandise). It also sets a maximum to import
(US$61 thousand a year). Brazilian politicians are enthusiastic about it, although traders and
shop owners think it is expensive and see too much bureaucratic and administrative work, which
sacoleiros will not be able or willing to do. Nevertheless, this law represents the peak of the cycle
of tolerance-repression-regulation to control illegal trade in the Tri-Border Region.
4.3. Money Exchangers: Cambistas
At the corners and busy streets in the centre of Ciudad del Este there are small groups of
men in their thirties and forties, carrying hand- and kangaroo bags on the waist. In their bags
there are guaranís, reales, Argentinean pesos, American dollars, yens and euros, reaching up to
an equivalent of US$ 2.500. These men exchange currencies, they are cambistas (exchangers).
Sacoleiros and other shoppers, tourists and above all locals, make use of the services rendered by
cambistas. On the street, there are some facilities available for them, such as chairs, telephone
lines, computers, internet, and tables that function as desks (Picture 4). Transactions take place
very fast: People walk to them or the cambista runs to the car to help the costumer, costumers
hand in banknotes, the cambista counts and exchanges the money. There is no negotiation on
the currency exchange rate since there is a standard rate.
Cambistas have a pivotal function in the ﬁnancial environment of Ciudad del Este, since
they link the ﬂows of cash coming from abroad into the local market. They play an important
role in money laundering as articulating incoming monetary ﬂows with local trade and retail.
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Their presence shows how marginal the share of the ﬁnancial institutions in the commercial and
monetary exchanges in Ciudad del Este is. In 2004, there was an estimated of about six hundred
cambistas working in the streets (Rabossi, 2004, p. 62) and there are no sources available on
the amount of cash they exchange. They are however registered in a confederación (union) that
ambiguously oﬃcialises the work they informally carry out. There is a parallel taxing structure,
visible in the fees the union collects from the exchangers, contributing this way to the ﬁnancing
of the Paraguayan state.
On the street, cambistas work in groups of four or six men under one leader. The leader sits
on a chair at the street corner or crossing point, and keeps an eye on his men. Remarkably, they
all are Paraguayan males, no females or foreigners visible, and speak Guaraní among them. The
organisation reproduces some kind of informal entrepreneurial structure: cambistas earn a ﬁxed
amount of money per day, independently from the number or value of the transactions made,
and have a ﬁxed location  that is why there are some amenities available. From the various
locations in Ciudad del Este's dowtown where cambistas can be found, the entrance points to
big stores and shopping centres, and the Pan-American Way are the busiest.
Once the exchangers have gathered certain amount of money or need a speciﬁc currency, they
come back to the leader to hand in or pick up cash. Banknotes in small denominations are widely
used for the transactions. Sat on the chair, the leader is continuously counting the money and
makes stacks. Apparently, there is no extra security available, which is remarkable in a city with
a high criminality rate.
Aguiar - Are you not scared of working on the street with that much money?
Cambista - No, there are many police oﬃcers. And people wouldn't dare. They know
it is death penalty [ﬁgurative].
However, it soon becomes clear that it is not only fear what protects cambistas. As many other
actors in the streets of Ciudad del Este do, they carry weapons to protect themselves; they keep
guns and knives in their bags or under the tables. Social control is also eﬀective. In case of
robbery, the potential thief would be in no time caught by the cambista in the next block.
5. Debate: Flows and Illegality at the Border
The activities and networks described in this article provide evidence on the smuggling at the
Tri-Border Region. Border synergy in this location is high, spurring the circulation of smuggled
goods and values between the nations. In the mobilisation of goods from a cross-border perspec-
tive, there is evidence of a complementarity in the traﬃcking networks and informal markets in
the three cities (see Figure 3).
GCST, New Voices Series, no. 6, October 2010 19
Stretching the Border: Smuggling Practices
and the Control of Illegality in South America José Carlos G. Aguiar
Given the status of Ciudad del Este as a free-trade zone and the low state control in Paraguay,
transcontinental traders are able to set up networks and open stores that ambiguously relate the
legal and illegal realm. Petty smugglers come to proﬁt from the shops in Paraguay and traﬃc in
electronics for the Brazilian market. The subsidised agricultural products of Brazil are smuggled
into Paraguay and Argentina. Groceries from Argentinian supermarkets are illegally transported
to Paraguay and Brazil, which is attractive given the currency rates. Hence, smuggling ﬂows
across the three cities are multidirectional. Diﬀerent goods and values are mobilised according
to the needs of the local market at each national corner. As a result, illegal markets at the
Tri-Border Region are complementary, not competitive. This allows each agent to specialise in
speciﬁc products, and networks to coexist.
A remarkable development in the region has to do with the rescaling of trade networks.
Since the 1980s there has been a growing transcontinental community, prompting new and larger
networks. International communities form a visible class of entrepreneurs that proﬁts from the
free-trade zone and quickly accommodates to a changing economic environment. The rise of
Chinese and Lebanese communities as entrepreneurs are a suitable example of this. These South-
South trade relations between industrial and commercial regions are not regulated by structures of
global governance, but by ethnicity and kinship. The associations international migrants establish
in part because they are vulnerable, but much more because pioneers proﬁt from new residents
become an advantage in the individualised Latin American societies. Latin American migrants
are, in contrast, not organised in Ciudad del Este, they lack a sense of community and end
up competing against each other. This may explain why transcontinental migrants are most
successful in the trading landscape of the region.
Perhaps the Tri-Border Region would have remained as a wild spot in the ambiguous geopoli-
tics of Latin America, as it was the case in the prior decades, but there is a growing international
attention on the region in the aftermath of September 11, 2001. The national governments of
Argentina, Brazil and, to certain extent Paraguay, are embarked in various policies to order the
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trade ﬂows. The regulation of smugglers as importers with the `sacoleiros law' is one example of
this.
Smuggling in the Tri-Border Region is not reduced to one product, actor or network, as
demonstrated. This urban conglomerate illustrates the synergy typical of borderlands: the extent
the frontier enhances the economy of the region as much as it organises the identity of the peoples
living here.
6. Final remarks
The networks and mobilisation of goods analysed in this article are helpful to establish the
concept of border synergy. Geopolitical frontiers are the epidermis of the nation state, ﬁltering and
regulating ﬂows of people, goods and values. Nevertheless, borderlands are never fully integrated
to national projects or absorbed by the political authority; they are perceived as the periphery
of the nation, spaces of in-betweenness. Even more, these regions often operate at the margin
of the law. Because of political or economic interests, the dynamics transgressing the legal order
are neglected or tolerated.
The national limits at the Tri-Border Region were set according to the geography of the
enclave, with the Iguazú and Paraná rivers as the natural conﬁnes of Argentina, Brazil and
Paraguay. Yet, the economy at this urban conglomerate has for decades taken place beyond the
limits of the national states. Circuits of illegal trade have emerged, complementing the economies
of the cities and delivering advantages for local actors. After decades of tolerance and tacit
encouragement, contraband at the Tri-Border Region has turned into a political issue at the
beginning of the 21st century. As a result, the border becomes a space of interdiction, but
diﬀerently from the struggles in the 19th and 20th century around the delimitation of borderlines,
it is now the capacity of the state to enforce the legal order what is at stake. The power of the
state to regulate border synergy is to be proved. The success of these programmes to order illegal
exchanges will in the long run depend on the capacity of the national state to comprehend the
scale and complementarity of the ﬂows observable at the Tri-Border Region.
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